registration provisions of the securities laws were high.' 0 Consequently, it carefully drafted a scheme of exemptions from the registration requirements. Through the private offering exemption, section 4(1) of the 1933 Act," and the civil liability provisions of section 12 of the 1933 Act,' 2 Congress achieved a balance between the rights of knowledgeable purchasers and those of private offering issuers.'"
The SEC, in response to the exhortations of Congress and securities law commentators,' 4 developed Regulation D as a "safe harbor" for issuers claiming an exemption from registration.' 5 Under Regulation D, the issuer obtains certain representations from the potential purchaser, or "offeree," to fulfill the requirements of the safe harbor. An issuer shields itself from potentially strict liability, imposed by section 12(1) of the 1933 Act,' 6 by obtaining warranties from the offeree covering her "suitability" for the offering and representations that she has read and understands the disclosure with which she was provided.
To reduce the costs of potential section 12(1) actions instituted by purchasers, the issuer enters into an indemnity agreement with each purchaser to protect itself from the costs of defending a lawsuit that fails to establish a securities law violation.'" The indemnity agreement is designed to hold the private offering investor to her representations. It also notifies the investor of the potential for a breach of warranty counterclaim should she initiate a fraud action and then expressly repudiate her warranties.
This Comment argues that the development of the private offering exemption and the statutory structure of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws permit an issuer to enforce such an indemnification agreement in limited circumstances. The indemnification may be structured to provide reimbursement by contract for the costs of defending a fraud action that fails to establish a violation of securities law by also infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (varying degrees of sophistication among investors is the basis for exempting certain securities). 10 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 337-40; see also W. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBI.IC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 4:02 (rev. ed. 1983) ("A private offering under the federal rules can be handled . . . with less expense" than a public offering.). 1 1933 Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982) .
tion evolved around determinations of the true "merit" of the securities offered to the investing public.
2 4 However, the underlying rationale of the regulatory proposal which led to the 1933 Act was based on an alternative philosophy: comprehensive disclosure. Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal . . . puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller ....
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least possible interference to honest business. 26 This overriding policy articulated by President Roosevelt is embodied in the two principal objectives of the 1933 Act. The first is "to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure regardaimed at promoters who 'would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple.'" L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 8 (footnote omitted).
24 Such legislation was proposed initially by Huston Thompson, a former member of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See Landis, supra note 9, at 30-31. Thompson's proposal called for the FTC to "revoke the registration of any security ... if upon examination ... it shall appear. . . that its affairs are in unsound condition ... or that the enterprise or business of the issuer . . . is not based upon sound principles, and that the revocation is in the interest of the public welfare." H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1933) . Merit regulation proposals were criticized sharply. See, e.g., Landis, supra note 9, at 30-33; id. at 32-33 ("[Tlhe Thompson bill ... provided no basis for sound federal securities legislation."). For a discussion concerning how the "merit" of a security permeated state blue sky regulation, see generally Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 899 (1982) . For an overview and discussion of recent developments concerning state merit blue sky laws, see Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986) . 25 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933) ; L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-TALS, supra note 1, at 35; 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 121-29. 28 President's Message, supra note 1, at 937.
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ing securities distributed to the public .... ,,17 This objective is achieved primarily through the registration provisions of section 5,28 which require that new issues of securities be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission" and be accompanied by a disclosure document if sold in interstate commerce. The second objective is "to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued." 30 This "antifraud" objective is enforced via private civil actions pursuant to sections 1181 and 12,32 in conjunction with other enforce-2 Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9. 28 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) . 9 Although the 1933 Act was originally administered by the FTC, the SEC was created by the 1934 Act to regulate the sale of securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, not the securities themselves. See 1934 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982 & Supp. III 1985 ; see also Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9-11 (discussing the role of the SEC).
10 Gadsby, supra note 1, at 9; see Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
s 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982) , provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue -(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner; (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. 32 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), provides:
Any person who -(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or (2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph°(2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omis-ment provisions. These sections are supplemented by section 14, which invalidates "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision" 3 3 of federal securities laws. As discussed below, these antifraud provisions are further supplemented by sections 10(b) and 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934"' and subsequent judicial interpretation.
3 5
A. The Private Offering Exemption
The registration and disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act were designed to provide adequate truthful disclosure to prevent issuers from misleading the investor. 6 Specifically, disclosure was designed to "place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller." '37 At the same time the drafters were cognizant of the impediments that the registration provisions placed on "honest business."
The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government. That bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it was, could hardly sion), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 33 1933 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) . 34 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); id. § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 789 (1982) . Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange -(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 3 See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. S6 See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION, supra note 1, at 128 & n.21 ("Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him."). [Vol. 136:971 equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was their money that they were spending. 8 In recognition of the "parity" which may exist between some buyers and sellers of certain types of securities, sections 3 and 439 created exemptions for certain issues and transactions. Over the past fifty years, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to its statutory authority, 40 has developed rules and regulations delineating "safe harbors" for exemption under these sections. 4 Among the statutory exemptions included in section 4 are "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." ' 4 2 Although the legislative history addressing this provision provides little guidance, 4 it does shed some light on the general direction the drafters believed this exemption should take. 4 4 The exemption included "an issuer [making] a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person" ' 45 and such transactions in which "there is no practical need for [the Act's] application or where the public benefits are too remote." 46 Transactions, however, were not to be exempted "unless [purchasers 11 Landis, supra note 9, at 37. The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $5,000,000.
41 Such exemptions include Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § § 230.501-.506 (1987) , which regulates new issues of private offerings, and Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987) , which exempts certain transactions in the secondary market. This Comment focuses solely on transactions by issuers in new issues.
Although the SEC has authority to promulgate rules exempting certain issues of are] so small in number that the sale to them does not constitute a public offering." ' 47 Until 1962, interpretation of the private offering exemption was based on a 1935 opinion of the SEC's General Counsel. 48 The opinion focused primarily on the factors to be considered in determining the availability of the exemption. 49 The SEC, alluding to a previous discussion of the Office of the General Counsel, stated that an offering to twenty-five or fewer persons does not involve a public offering and, hence, is an exempted transaction. 5 " The release also highlighted other factors such as 1) the relationship of offerees to each other and the issuer; 2) the number of units offered; 3) the size of the offering in dollar terms; and 4) the manner of the offering. 5 1
The SEC release implied that members of certain classes of offerees, whose membership "may be determined by the application of some pre-existing standard," would not constitute members of the general public, and thus did not require the full protections theoretically afforded by the disclosure and registration requirements. 52 These classes consist primarily of investors with special knowledge of the issuer, such as "insiders," and those with "economic bargaining power." 5 Subsequent statutory and administrative pronouncements concerning the private offering exemption continue to follow this classification scheme.
The Supreme Court, however, suggested that the private offering exemption was based on criteria other than the number of offerees. In 1953, the Court held in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 54 that the availability of the exemption depended upon the extent to which the offerees needed the protections of the Act. In Ralston Purina, an employer distributed its unissued common stock through a private offering to select employees who were willing to "take the initiative and [were] interested ' ABA Position Paper, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAw. 485, 486 (1975) in buying stock at present market prices. ' The company willingly conceded that a similar offering to all its employees would have constituted a public offering but contended that because the employees allowed to purchase the stock were chosen at management's discretion, the offering was private. 5 " In holding that "corporate employees, as a class," could not be deprived of the protections of the registration and disclosure provisions through such an offering, 57 the Court stated:
[T]he exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees . . . .The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration. The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose. The obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable that they be entitled to compliance with section 5.58
Despite Ralston Purina, subsequent SEC interpretations of the exemption continued to emphasize the relevance of "counting noses." 5 9 Judicial decisions subsequent to Ralston Purina frequently denied the exemption and found the registration provisions violated, often in egregious cases. 60 In the face of conflicting and confusing interpretations by 11 See, e.g., Great N. Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 266, 268 (1970) . 60 See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., Inc. 463 F.2d 137, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1972 ) (letters from investors asserting knowledge of the investment held insufficient to justify exemption without proof that all offerees had contact with Continental officers and access to any additional information); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1971) (no exemption allowed because offerees received inaccurate and insufficient information); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971 ) (evidence of private offering cannot be based on conclusory statements); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir.) (none of the purchasers possessed required knowledge that would have been available in a registration statement), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967) . But see, e.g., Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 358 (10th Cir. 1970 ) (allowing private offering exemption because seller not required to state every fact which might influence a purchaser's decision); Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963 ) (small number of offerees, small size of transactions, small number of units sold, and the knowledge of the offerees held sufficient to establish a private offering); Woodward v. Wrights, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959 ) (arrangement made between close friends and acquaintances on a personal basis constituted a private offering); Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 , 1112 (D. Mass. 1974 ) (although offerees did not sign investment letters or possess all information required by registration, surrounding circumstances, such as close relationships and business expertise of offerees, provided sufficient basis for allowing the private offering exemption); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Del. 1971 ) (access to relevant data, rather than all that a registration statement would have revealed, constitutes basis for private offering if the transaction involves offerees with business expertise; however, this result did not follow as a matter of law the SEC and the judiciary, soon-to-be SEC Chairman Garrett espoused his view that the combined body of law concerning the private offering exemption was a "kind of mishmash . . .[where tihe saving recipe is kept secret, a moving target which [the issuer] can never be sure he has hit." '6' Furthermore, some commentators thought the exemption was destroyed by two Fifth Circuit cases. 6 2 In the face of the uncertainties surrounding the private offering exemption, the SEC proposed a safe harbor in Rule 146.63 The Rule specified conditions that, if observed, would ensure that a particular transaction would qualify for a section 4(2) exemption. 64 but depended on factual analysis); Vicioso v. Watson, 325 F. Supp. 1071 , 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1971 ) (transaction constituted a private offering because only two investors were involved and deal was made through direct negotiations); Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1965 ) (no public offering found because investors were few in number, sophisticated businessmen, and had access to all information which registration would disclose), aff 'd, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966 (Special Issue, Mar. 1974) . The two cases were Continental Tobacco, 463 F.2d at 161 (issuers failed to establish that offerees had a "privileged" relationship with Continental Tobacco), and Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972 ) (defendants failed to meet burden of proof to establish a private offering because they presented no evidence of the number of offerees, the relationships between ofiterees and issuer, the offerees' knowledge of each other, or the manner of the offering). Some commentators believed that these cases narrowed the exemption by requiring "insider" status of the offerees. See, e.g [Vol. 136:971
SHIFTING OF DEFENSE COSTS
While the courts heralded Rule 146 as a "serotine development," 5 practitioners 6 and academics"' greeted it with criticism. The Rule proved problematic because it was essentially a codification of the vagueness of preexisting law.
8 It created the possibility that a minor infraction of one "condition," such as the failure to file a form, could render an issuer strictly liable under section 12(1) for rescission of an entire offering, regardless of the significance of the violation. In addition, implementation of the Rule became difficult and costly almost immediately." 9 By 1978, the prophecies of the early critics of the rule had become reality. Indeed, SEC Chairman Harold Williams himself recognized the shortcomings of Rule 146. He acknowledged that modifications to Rule 146 were necessary to "benefit . . .small businesses seeking to raise capital. Compliance with the rule was . . . unduly complex, costly, and subjective, with an unacceptable level of risk that the exemption may be lost inadvertently. aid small businesses in raising capital apart from the section 4(2) exemption, the use of that exemption more frequently occurred in real estate and oil and gas syndications."' In response to these problems, the SEC adopted Regulation D" in 1982. It provides a comprehensive safe harbor to remove "disproportionate restraints on small issuers" and to develop a uniform exemption from registration "in order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors." 7 1 6 The three exemptions provided by Regulation D are found in Rules 504, 505, and 506.77 Rules 504 and 505 provide exemptions under section 3(b) based on aggregate offering pricey.
7
Rule 504 is designed primarily for small issuers engaged in intrastate offerings. 7 Rule 505 offerings are limited to $5 million and sales may be made to accredited investors and up to thirty-five "purchasers that are not accredited investors." 8 0 Rule 506 provides an exemption for offerings without regard to aggregate offering price pursu- § 77c(b) (1982)). The provisions of Rule 506 are consistent with legislative history and subsequent judicial and administrative interpretations of the section 4(2) exemption. The criteria for accredited investor status embody the economic bargaining power or specialized knowledge standards of previous interpretations. Exemptions are provided for those investors with "knowledge," such as institutions or executive officers, 3 and those with economic bargaining power, such as high-income or high-net worth individuals. 4 In addition, Rule 506 requires that "unaccredited" pur- (a) Accredited Investor. "Accredited investor" shall mean any person who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes comes within any of the following categories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person:
7' See
(1) Any bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act whether acting in its individual or fiduciary capacity; insurance company as defined in section 2(13) of the Act; investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a business development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of that Act; Small Business Investment Company licensed by the U.S. Small Business Administration under section 301 (c) or (d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958; employee benefit plan within the meaning of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, if the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as defined in section 3(21) of such Act, which is either a bank, insurance company, or registered investment adviser, or if the employee benefit plan has total assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(2) Any private business development company as defined in section 202(a)(22) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; (3) Any organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code with total assets in excess of $5,000,000; (4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer .. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(4) (1987) .
The proposed revisions to Regulation D would "extend the definition of accredited investor to include various institutional investors, such [as] savings and loan associations and broker-dealers, certain trusts, partnerships and corporations, and to permit a joint as well as an individual income test .... " See Proposed Revisions, supra note 75, at 88,400 (footnote omitted).
84 Rule 501(a) (5)- (8) classifies the following as accredited investors: (5) Any person who purchases at least $150,000 of the securities being offered, where the purchaser's total purchase price does not exceed 20 percent of the purchaser's net worth at the time of sale, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, for one or any combination of the following: (i) Cash, (ii) securities for which market quotations are readily available, (iii) chasers be sophisticated, i.e., that they have "knowledge and experience" to assess the risks and merits of the offering 5 without regard to the purchaser's ability to withstand the economic risk of the offering. 86 These terms of Regulation D represent a combined legislative, judicial, and administrative acknowledgment that certain investors do not need the protections afforded by the registration requirements when they have the requisite knowledge, economic or bargaining, power, or expertise to protect themselves.
B. The Fraud Liability Provisions
In response to the President's Message 7 and to the "tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings" 8 in $25 billion of worthless securities, 9 Congress included in the 1933 Act provisions to remove the common law obstacles to fraud recovery and to penalize the sellers of fraudulent securities." 0 These provisions included express civil remedies for defrauded purchasers of securities, 9 a general antifraud provision for SEC enforcement, 9 2 and criminal sanctions for an unconditional obligation to pay cash or securities for which market quotations are readily available which obligation is to be discharged within five years of the sale of the securities to the purchaser, or (iv) the cancellation of any indebtedness owed by the issuer to the purchaser; (6) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000; (7) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years and who reasonably expects an income in excess of $200,000 in the current year; and (8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors under paragraphs (a) (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of this section. 17 C.F.R. § 501(a)(5)- (8) 
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various other classes of persons such as directors, experts, and underwriters. Liability is incurred when the registration statement or any part thereof contains "an untrue statement of a material fact or [omission of] a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. '95 Section 11, however, does not impose absolute liability on all participants involved in formulating the registration statements; 9 indeed, there are some statutory defenses. 7 By its express terms, section 11 covers liability for registration statements and, therefore, is not generally relevant to offerings claiming an exemption from registration requirements.
Section 12 contains two provisions. Section 12(1)9" imposes liability for rescission for violations of the registration requirements in section 5. In order to deter noncompliance with the registration requirements, 99 liability under section 12(1) is "virtually absolute."' 100 If an issuer misses the target of a section 4(2) exemption and has not complied with the registration requirements under section 12(1), she then becomes strictly liable for rescission. 10 1 The only defense to a section " 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C § 77k(a) (1982 " Underwriters and certain other enumerated classes are provided with a "due diligence" defense if they can show that they did not know and could not reasonably have discovered an untrue or misleading material statement or the existence of a material omission. 1933 Act § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982) . Furthermore, underwriters and others are not responsible for material misstatements in "expertised" portions of registration statements. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) . Insiders, such as officers and directors, must satisfy a high burden to establish a due diligence defense; alternatively, they may engage in "whistle blowing" by resigning and notifying the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 1933 Act § 11(b)2, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2) See, e.g., Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir 1986 ), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987 Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 , 1442 -43 (9th Cir. 1984 ; SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 158-60 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Anastasi v. American Petroleum, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 273, 274-75 (D. Colo. 1984) . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pinter to review the scope of the term "seller" under § 12(1) and to determine if the common law defense of in pari delicto is available in a § 12 (1) For private civil plaintiffs, section 12(2) serves as a broad antifraud provision unrelated to the registration requirements.' 0 Section 12(2) applies to any sale of a security regardless of exemptions. 0 . and, in addition, covers all false or misleading statements, whether oral or written.
10 5 Section 12(2) reaches a broad class of sellers by requiring privity between the seller and the person purchasing such security.' 0 6 Furthermore, if "a purchaser is in privity with the defendant [seller] , but the defendant is not named in section 11 (e.g., a dealer in a selling group), the purchaser could sue him only under section 12(2).' 1 107 Section 12(2) places the burden on the plaintiff to prove her lack of knowledge. This contrasts with section 11 under which the burden rests on the defendant to prove that a plaintiff had knowledge. 0 8 Section 12(2) also does not contain the defenses to liability, such as "expertising," included in section 11. Finally, proof of reliance on the false or misleading statement is unnecessary under section 12(2).'0' § 12(1). In its report accompanying these provisions, the House Committee stated that "the duty of care to discover [fraud] varies in its demands upon participants in security distribution with the importance of their place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection that the public has a right to expect." ' 1 1 Viewed with regard to liability under sections 11 and 12, this statement illuminates the sliding scale of liability that those sections create. First, the importance of the participant/defendant's role conditions the procedural and substantive aspects of her liability and defenses. Second, "the degree of protection" that the purchasers may expect suggests a legislative intent to facilitate recovery for violations of registration requirements and to impede recovery for purchasers of exempt securities relative to purchasers of registered securities. Taken together, these explanations reflect a legislative judgment that the purchaser of an exempt security should not receive the same general litigation advantages from the express liability provisions as those provided to purchasers of registered securities.",
Implied Actions Under the 1934 Act
The 1933 Act regulated the issuance of new securities. To remedy the "purely speculative operations" of the various exchanges, 12 however, Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was enacted to supplement the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act by creating an enforcement vehicle for the new Securities and Exchange Commission." 3 Under its broad rulemaking power, the Securities and Exchange Commission hurriedly . 4 added the present heart of the civil antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-5, 115 
I. THE EMERGENCE AND FAILINGS OF "BAD FAITH" IN

THE PRIVATE OFFERING CONTEXT
Commentators greeted the broad civil liability provisions of sections 11 and 12 with criticism of the in terrorem effect such sweeping (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 117 The 1934 Act did create certain express civil liability provisions, none of which is applicable specifically to a new issue of securities claiming a private offering exemption. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides an express civil remedy for a person who purchases or sells a registered security on a national exchange at a price affected by unlawful manipulation. 1934 Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982). Section 18 grants a cause of action to a person who purchases or sells a security in reliance on a false or misleading statement made in a document filed with the SEC. In any suit under this or any other section of this title the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant such costs may be assessed in favor of such party litigant . . .if the court believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him .... 127 Congressional shifting of attorneys' fees found in section 11(e) is thought to be one of the exceptions to the general "American Rule" concerning payment of legal fees in litigation.' 2 Under the American Rule each party litigant bears his own attorneys' fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation. 2 9 Fees also may be shifted under the "common benefit" rule which spreads the cost of litigation among those who are benefited by the action' 3 " or when liti-121 See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 , 43 YALE L.J. 171, 210-16 (1933 § 1988 (1982) ). For a comprehensive collection of attorneys' fee statutes, see Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1985) ; Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260-69. [Vol. 136:971 gation is commenced or conducted by either party "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons ....11131
In securities fraud cases involving section 11 (e), courts apply different standards to determine the meaning of "without merit. ' 132 Most courts, however, have included the concept of "bad faith" in their decisionmaking process.
1 33 Further clouding the meaning of "without merit" is the fact that the courts are split as to the meaning of bad faith and its applicability to "colorable" claims." 3 Although the specific term "bad faith" does appear in the Senate Committee Report accompanying the Fletcher Amendments, Professor Loss points out that the imputation of a bad faith requirement to a meritless claim is dubious." 3 5 A better interpretation suggests that Congress really intended to create two separate situations in which fees could be shifted: strike suits and bad faith litigation. This reading is further supported by a Conference Committee report accompanying the amendment to section 11(e) of the 1933 Act:
It provides, as a defense against blackmail suits as well as a defense against purely contentious litigation on the part of Apr. 24, 1985) ("without merit" requires showing that claim does not simply lack merit but also borders on frivolous) and Robert Alan Ins. Agency v. Girard Bank, No. 83-2370 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1987 ) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("failure of a party to present sufficient evidence at trial . . . does not, standing alone, support a determination . . . that attorney's fees should be awarded") with Western Fed. Corp. v. Erikson, 739 F.2d 1439 , 1444 (9th Cir. 1984 ) ("without merit" standard includes claims and defenses that "either are brought in bad faith or border on the frivolous"); accord Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) .
"I See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1214; see also cases cited supra note 19 (discussing the application of the "bad faith-frivolous claim" standard).
"" See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1212. Compare DASA Corp., 560 F.2d at 1088 (award of attorneys' fees not supported by trial court finding that litigation was conducted in bad faith to force reduction in conversion price of stock because legal claim was based on "colorable" theory) with In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1978) (litigation motivated by vindictiveness supports "bad faith" award of attorney's fees despite presentation of colorable legal claim), affd sub. nom. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . 11 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1213. "In order to give protection against 'strike' suits, or litigation brought in bad faith, the court is authorized to assess reasonable costs, including attorney's fees against either party to the suit . .. . S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) . The section of the report from which this was taken later became § 9(e) of the 1934 Act.
the defendant, that a court can require a bond for costs and can assess costs against the plaintiff if his suit had no merit or against the defendant if his defense had none. The suggested amendments seem equitable. 1 " 6
The modern Supreme Court's interpretation of attorneys' fees provisions in securities fraud cases further supports reading the bad faith standard out of certain strike suit situations. In Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co.," 37 the Court liberally construed similar fee-shifting provisions in the securities context. Mills involved the use of a misleading statement in proxy solicitation material, 38 a possible violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. 139 After concluding a private right of action did exist under section 14(a),"40 the Court fashioned a remedy for a consummated complex merger that was "fair" on its term."" The Court concluded that in the absence of an express statutory authorization for the award of attorneys' fees under section 14(a), the express provisions in sections 9(e) and 18(a) "should not be read as denying to the courts the power to award fees in suits under other sections of the Act when circumstances make such an award appropriate ...
. ""'
In determining when circumstances were appropriate, the Court reasoned that the clear remedial provisions of other statutes may foreclose implying a right to a fee award; however, the broad remedial purposes of the 1934 Act did not prevent courts from granting appropriate remedies. 1 4 Similar to the implied right of action reasoning of J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 1 4 "[t] he courts must . . . determine whether the special circumstances exist that would justify an award of attorneys' fees . . M"45 Justice Black, dissenting from this part of the opinion, indicated that contractual arrangements to shift attorney's fees may be valid. "I do not agree. 146 Mills, 396 U.S. at 391. The remainder of the opinion, which held that attorneys' fee awards were appropriate for the bestowal of a "common benefit" for private enforcement of a statutory law, was limited by Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-69 (1975 held that plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 actions must allege and prove "scienter," i.e., an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, on the part of the defendant. 49 As part of its rationale, the Court noted that "the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act . . .
[including] § 11, ...
[were] subject to significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b)." ' 0 This would include § 11(e)'s security-for-costs provision. 5 Applying this flexible interpretation to the combined purposes of the registration exemptions, antifraud provisions, and section 11(e) leads to this possible conclusion: Congress did intend for certain potential plaintiffs-those who were not to receive the same protections afforded the general public under the Acts1 55 -to be deterred more from bringing suits for their settlement value. Such an interpretation also implies a different standard for feeshifting under section 11(e).
The concept of "settlement value," moreover, is much different for the plaintiff involved in a private offering than one involved in a public offering. Offerings exempted from the registration requirements also 146 Mills, 396 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). . are exempted from the margin requirements of the 1934 Act. 15 8 Exempt offerings, therefore, may be purchased with any combination of cash and installment or demand debt. In the tax shelter area, for example, the security is purchased often with a relatively small initial cash investment and a full recourse loan for the balance of the offering price. 157 By instituting a fraud action under sections 10(b) and 12(2) for a failed investment, 15 8 the investor may be seeking release from her 15' 1934 Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982) , requires the Federal Reserve Board to "prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security (other than an exempted security)." The Board's primary regulations in this area are as follows: Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § § 207.1-.7 (1987) (governing lending by other persons who engage in the business of making loans for purchasing or carrying margin securities); Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § § 220.1-.18 (1987) (governing lending on securities by broker-dealers); Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § § 221.1-.8 (1987) (governing loans made by banks for purchasing or carrying margin stock or that are secured by margin stock); Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § § 224.1-.3 (1987) (governing borrowing by persons in the U.S. from domestic or foreign lenders for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities). For a general discussion of lending on securities by broker-dealers and banks, see REPORT ON SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 15-25 (1963) .
Under Regulation T, private placements and small business offerings are explicitly exempted. 12 C.F. R. § 220.12 (1987) . In addition, the Federal Reserve Board has taken the position that offerings made under Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § § 230.505-.506 (1987) , are exempt from the operation of Regulation T, supra. See Interpretative Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,054 (1983) . For a detailed discussion of Regulation T, see 4 R. recourse obligation. One commentator, discussing this type of suit from the perspective of the lender, summarized the problem as follows: [T] he lender seeking to collect on . . . investor notes may face a series of rather formidable hurdles to overcome if the business of the venture fails . . . . For in those circumstances, investors will not be particularly eager . . . to permit realization on the collateral security . . . and may be expected to invoke any and all possible claims and defenses, however spurious. 15 In these circumstances, defendants are tempted to trade off collection of the recourse debt against the potential costs of defending a fraud suit. 6 0 Thus, the private offering investor may receive value in a suit without merit. It is these types of actions which typify "modern" strike 
(1978).
0 The cost of defending securities fraud suits is significant in relation to the amount of the investor's initial investment. For example, defense costs in Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 627 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y.) , affd, 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 162-73, were claimed to be $555,000 for the issuer and the underwriter, while Zissu's investment totalled only $1.5 million. See Zissu, 627 F. Supp. at 689, 690-91. Defendants also often face the prospect of litigating investor claims in different jurisdictions at the same time. Cf. Kashner, supra note 157, at 172 (lenders seeking to collect on investor notes face task of collecting from a number of individuals who may reside in different jurisdictions).
The possibility of liability under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961-68 (1982) , in the context of securities fraud may increase the temptation for abuse. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1984 482, 487-88 (2d Cir. ), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985 . RICO provides a number of advantages to the securities plaintiff including treble damages, attorneys' fees, a broad scope of discovery, broad venue choices, and an opportunity to avoid the substantive restrictions of securities laws by bringing a RICO claim based on mail or wire fraud rather than a § 12(2) or a § 10(b) claim. In fact, "RICO claims are now being routinely added to complaints based on alleged securities law violations At least one court granted judgment for the plaintiff on a recourse obligation owed to him by a defendant despite the court's conclusion that securities laws were not violated by the defendants. See Eriksson v. Galvin, 484 F. Supp. 1108 , 1129 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980 ) (describing judgment based on long-overdue note as "merely a pyrrhic victory").
suits.
III. THE USE OF INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ESTABLISHING BAD FAITH
The modern strike suit in the private offering context subverts the purposes of securities laws to provide "sliding scale" antifraud remedies and to aid the capital formation goals embodied in the private offering exemption. Additionally, the imputed "bad faith-frivolous claim" standard of section 11(e) does not achieve its deterrent purposes when the private offering investor has an expected settlement value lower than the defendants' costs of first establishing compliance with the securities law and thereafter prevailing on a bad faith claim. Under these circumstances the issuer who qualifies for the private offering exemption may protect himself via a contractual agreement such as Justice Black suggested in ' In certain limited circumstances, the contract would not violate federal securities laws; moreover, the contract actually can be structured to further the purposes of the disclosure requirements in the private offering context.
The case of Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co. ' is illustrative of the modern strike suit and a contractual agreement which, with some modification, should survive judicial scrutiny. The plaintiff, Frederick Zissu, purchased $1.5 million of a private offering oil and gas limited partnership as a tax shelter. affd, 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986 ).
In conformity with Rule 146 requirements, 16 5 the plaintiff had represented that he was a wealthy, sophisticated investor and that he not only had read and understood the investment literature but also was able to bear the financial risks of the offering. 1 66 When the venture proved "less successful . . . than [Zissu] had . . . hoped,"' 67 he instituted a fraud action under sections 10(b) and 12(2). The defendants"" counterclaimed based on the above provision and the plaintiff's breach of his express warranties.' 6 9 At trial the jury found no violations of securities laws and granted the defendants' breach of warranty counterclaim. 7 0 On appeal the Second Circuit upheld the award of fees based on bad faith but avoided determining the validity of the counterclaim, finding the drafting of the indemnity clause "not sufficiently specific" to hold Zissu liable for the costs of defending the suit.' Had the damage provision been more specific, the contractual counterclaim would not violate federal securities laws or their underlying policies. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 177 the Court held that section "29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act."'T' An indemnity clause merely holds the buyer to her warranties; it does not waive any substantive rights.
If an issuer has complied with the terms of Regulation D, particularly its "accredited investor" or "sophisticated purchaser" requirements, then the buyer and seller are in parity. Under these circumstances, the investor does not need the full protections available under the registration provisions. Exempting the issuer from registration requirements, therefore, is consistent with the views expressed by the SEC,' 179 Congress,' 8 0 and the Court.' s ' Because the law finds that the buyer and seller are on "equal footing" when the requirements of Regulation D are satisfied, indemnification contracts from the investor to the issuer would not constitute contracts of adhesion.
The purpose of the contractual indemnification provision is to hold a wealthy and sophisticated investor to her warranties and to ensure that she has read and understands the precise disclosures with which the law requires she be provided. To hold that such a provision is "contrary to the Act" makes disclosure the futile and expensive exercise many fear.' 82 After all, who is better situated to understand the man- § 78cc(a) (1982) . 175 346 U. S. 427, 435-36 (1953) . Wilko is most widely known for its implications concerning the arbitrability of federal and state securities law claims under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § § 1-14 (1982 This view also is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 29(b) in Mills:
[The] language [of section 29(b) ] establishes that the guilty party is precluded from enforcing the contract against an unwilling innocent party, but it does not compel the conclusion that the contract is a nullity, creating no enforceable rights given to the incremental value of a specific disclosure requirement); H. KRIPKE REv. 132, 141-49 (1973) (mathematical analysis of the impact of required disclosure on market returns, concluding that disclosure requirements have no measurable positive effect on returns).
183 Alarmingly, one court appears to have permitted a sophisticated investor to expressly repudiate his representations in the subscription agreement that he read the required disclosure. This court found that the investor's attorney and personal advisor "should have known that [the investor] would not read the placement materials . .. . DuPont v. Brady, 646 F. Supp. 1067 , 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1986 ). The court based its finding on the length of the relationship between the investor and his advisors and their knowledge of the manner in which the investor approached his investments. S. 38 (1941) . Frost involved the sale of unregistered stock from an issuer to an underwriter based on an exclusive contract. See id. at 39. When the underwriter sued for performance of the contract, the issuer claimed the contract was void because it constituted an unregistered public offering in violation of the securities laws. See id. In what Professor Loss described as a hard case that possibly made "bad law," see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1048, the Court declined to enforce the contract given the other remedies available to the underwriter under the securities laws: "[Tihe clear legislative purpose [of § 29(b) is the] protection of innocent purchasers of securities. They are given definite remedies inconsistent with the idea that every contract having relation to sales of unregistered share is absolutely void .
" 312 U.S. at 43. 185 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Zissu defendants, who were the innocent parties, should not be precluded by federal securities law from enforcing the indemnity contract and, thus, should not be required to meet a "bad faith-frivolous claim" standard to shift defense costs to the plaintiff.
One argument against allowing such counterclaims is the potential "chilling" effect these claims might have on plaintiffs seeking to enforce their rights.' 89 Closer examination of the circumstances that constitute a breach of an investor's warranties, however, suggests that the burden of such actions will fall upon investors who breach their express warranties for reasons contrary to the basis for the statutory right on which the investors are suing. After all, the breach is not the filing of the lawsuit, but the express repudiation of the warranties by the investor during the litigation. The Zissu clause expressly preserves the investor's right to file the suit. The counterclaim is established when the investor repudiates her warranties. Due to her qualification as an accredited or sophisticated investor, she is deemed to understand her warranties and accept the ramifications stemming therefrom when she purchases the investment.
The private offering plaintiff who legitimately did not know of the indemnification or its effect is not precluded from proving the defendant's liability under sections 12(2) or 10(b) for failing to adequately inform the investor. Because section 12(2) liability also attaches to both oral and written statements, the defendant could not orally repudiate the clause at the time of sale in an effort to induce the investor into the offering and later assert the counterclaim without violating that section. Furthermore, in an action under section 12(2), the plaintiff already bears the burden of proving her lack of knowledge,' 90 and the plaintiff need not show reliance on the false or misleading statement or omission in making the investment. 9 ' Thus, the mere existence of the indemnifi-188 396 U.S. at 387-88 (citing Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, ,792 (8th Cir. 1967 [Vol. 136:971 cation clause does not impede the investor's fraud action. In terms of who could make the counterclaim and still avoid liability, section 12(2) liability extends to a broad class of sellers. Any defendant, therefore, asserting the breach counterclaim would almost certainly be included should the investor establish a violation. 1 92 In sum, the private offering plaintiff bears no additional burden in establishing a section 12(2) action when she is held to her express warranties than she does without the indemnification clause.
Finally, if the issuer has failed to comply with securities laws, then, under the above interpretations of sections 14 and 29, it is no longer an innocent party and therefore is barred from establishing its counterclaim.
Limiting the enforceability of such agreements to private offerings that qualify for the exemption from registration under Regulation D reduces a risk to issuers that the SEC implicitly acknowledges exists. The terms of Regulation D reflect the fact that a private offering plaintiff may misrepresent, at times, her eligibility as an accredited investor or sophisticated purchaser status. Indeed, "[t]he definition of 'accredited investor' includes any person who comes within or 'who the issuer reasonably believes' comes within one of the enumerated categories . ... .
While the SEC remains reluctant to define what constitutes a reasonable belief, 194 offeree sophistication continues to play a role in maintaining the Rule 506 exemption.
1 95 The imposition of section 12(1) liability for violations of section 5 in such circumstances is a needless risk, unduly hindering the capital formation purposes of the private offering exemption.
The effect of enforcement of indemnifications in the private offering context, in terms of the intended legislative policy of section 11(e) 1 96 and the judicial belief that that section was meant to deter suits brought for settlement value, 9 " is merely to deter those actions which inflict unwarranted litigation expense on the issuer. This is consonant with 'Congress' intent in enacting section 11(e) in 1934.
The public policy implications of the potential chilling effect of private offering indemnification provisions were considered by Judge Edward Weinfeld in Zissu:
Indeed, public policy considerations require that Zissu be held to his express obligations in order to encourage respect for the law and to impress upon him and others that specifically defined commitments and representations are not scraps of paper to be disregarded at will. If the enforcement of this indemnification clause on these facts deters future Frederick Zissus from repudiating expressly stated representations and testifying . . . contrary to the facts warranted, it is fatuous to argue that it is contrary to public policy. 198 
CONCLUSION
Sellers of private offerings claiming an exemption from the registration provisions of federal securities law should be entitled to enforce indemnification clauses included in the subscription documents in the proper circumstances. To be eligible to do so, the seller must have complied fully with federal securities laws, including disclosing the existence and effect of the indemnification clause. In order for the seller's counterclaim to succeed, the investor must have failed to demonstrate a securities law violation and also have repudiated her express warranties. The investor must be sophisticated or misrepresent her suitability for a private offering.
In light of the combined legislative, judicial, and administrative judgments that Regulation D expresses, issuers and purchasers should be viewed as operating on equal footing with regard to disclosure when the offering complies with federal securities laws. For the issuer, this means that the offering has complied with the exemption requirements and that no false or misleading statements or omissions exist. For the purchaser, this means she has received all the protections to which she is entitled under the "sliding scale" provisions of securities laws.
Indemnification contracts in these circumstances should not be considered void as contrary to public policy. In fact, they further the underlying policies of disclosure and capital formation. The indemnity agreement provides an incentive for the sophisticated offeree to read the disclosure mandated by law which she can reasonably be expected to understand. The capital formation policies of the private offering exemption are furthered by reducing the risks of section 12(1) liability and deterring meritless suits against the issuer.
